Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Liberty by Traynor, Michael
On September 18, Constitution Day, theSchool of Law was honored to haveMichael Traynor, president of the
American Law Institute and senior counsel at
Cooley Godward LLP, speak as part of the Jesse
Carter Distinguished Lecture Series. The series
memorializes the Hon. Jesse Carter, a 1913 graduate of GGU
School of Law and California Supreme Court Justice from 1939 to
1959. Justice Carter was a colleague for almost 20 years of Traynor’s
father, the Hon. Roger J. Traynor, who served as an Associate Justice
upon his appointment in 1940 and later as Chief Justice.
An excerpt from Michael Traynor’s talk appears below.
His complete speech will be published in the January 2007 issue of
the Golden Gate University Law Review, available for sale through the
GGU Law Review directly or online through Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis,
and HeinOnline at: 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. No. 2 (2007).
The term “judicial independence” is widely misunder-stood. To some, “independence” connotes inappropriate“activism” or quests to “create” law unbound by the
constraints of statutes or common law precedents. For many
thoughtful people it is an “I know it when I see it” kind of term.
Like the elusive phrase “sustainable development” in environ-
mental discussions, it reflects values that are important to
the people who hold them even though they may not agree
about details.
The term in my view connotes judges whose tenure is
reasonably secure, who have been selected carefully (recognizing
that systems of selection vary), and who will decide cases
according to the rule of law unconstrained by political fear,
fear for physical safety, or other undue pressures, and uninflu-
enced by the status of the parties, the threat of salary reductions,
or extraneous considerations. These characteristics are the
basic ones, although it is possible to imagine heroic judges acting
independently even if they were selected solely for political
reasons or lack secure tenure.
It bears emphasis that there are relationships between
and among our three branches of government. A good example
is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
explaining that the President’s unilateral decision to institute
military tribunals for Guantanamo prisoners disregarded
statutory constraints imposed by Congress and that the proper
way for a President to address such matters is to work with
Congress. Judicial independence should not connote the image
of some isolated jurist in the desert completely separated from
reality, including separated from the legislature and the
executive, or immune from constraints or criticism. After all,
legislatures provide the funds for the salaries of judges and the
operations of their courts and enact jurisdictional statutes;
executives often nominate or appoint judges; and within
constitutional limits both the legislature and the executive
can change the law that a judge has applied, sometimes in an
“ongoing colloquy” between the branches. Judicial accountability
is an integral part of judicial independence.
Why Is Judicial Independence Important?
Our Declaration of Independence describes the British king as
having “made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure
of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.” Thomas Paine, providing common sense for the
American Revolution, said “Where, you may ask, is our king?
In monarchies, the king is the law. In our democracy, the law
is king.”
In contrast to monarchical domination, Article III of
our Constitution provides that federal judges “hold their
Offices during good Behavior” and that their compensation
“shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”
Independence of judges from the will of the executive and from
threats to their compensation is crucial.
Judicial independence is especially important today
because the judiciary and the rule of law are under relentless
and severe attacks from various quarters: In ways that both
challenge Congress and may implicate the judiciary, the
President is bypassing the separation of powers, for example,
by the misuse of so-called signing statements saying that he
will or may not follow an act of Congress, a practice recently
and correctly condemned by the American Bar Association.
Can We Distinguish Between Appropriate and
Inappropriate Criticism of the Judiciary?
Judges are public officials. With rare exceptions, their rulings
are public records. Their actions in court are usually open to
the public and often also are recorded by a court reporter or
tape recorder, although such recordings cannot fully capture
the judge’s demeanor.
Judges are subject to procedural and substantive constraints,
such as principles of personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction, standing, ripeness, mootness, applicable statutes
and rules, the common law, and precedent and stare decisis.
Courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States or
the highest state court on a nonfederal issue are also subject to
appellate review. They are not free to disregard these constraints.
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Two key implications of the foregoing
group of constraints are, first, they provide
litigants and the public an extensive set of
safeguards against judicial abuse or an
individual judge’s pursuit of personal goals
or policies; and, second, they provide
objective standards for analyzing and
critiquing individual decisions. If critics
think that a decision is wrong, invoking
one or more of these objective standards in
criticizing a decision not only is a permissible
First Amendment right, it also is healthy
and constructive. The law reviews are full
of articles and student notes that often crit-
icize as well as sometimes praise a judicial
decision. When they or other commentators
criticize a judicial decision for exceeding
or violating one of these standards, they
contribute to the marketplace of ideas for
potential improvement. Because their com-
ments by definition invoke an objective
standard, they can be assessed for their
persuasiveness, objectivity, and rationality.
It also is appropriate as well as poten-
tially constructive for commentators to
criticize judges that do not live up to minimal
standards. For example, is the judge pre-
pared, competent, and alert? Is she courteous
to witnesses, jurors, parties, counsel, court
staff, and others? Is the hearing and
decision unburdened by undue delay? Does
the judge listen impartially to the evidence
and argument? If a written decision is
prepared, is it intelligible? Critical comments
again can be evaluated on the basis of their
persuasiveness, objectivity, and rationality.
In May, Chief Justice John Roberts
gave a welcome and friendly greeting to
the members of the American Law Institute
at our annual meeting in Washington, D.C.
He distinguished between “informed criti-
cism of judicial decisions” and “collateral
attacks” on judges “because of disagreements
with their decisions.”
What are the limits, if any, to criticism
of individual judges, individual decisions,
and the judiciary as an institution? Apart
from violations of the criminal law or acts
that constitute contempt of court, given the
extensive protections of the First Amendment,
there are very few limits on what is permis-
sible criticism, as distinguished from what
is appropriate or fair criticism.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, chal-
lenged life tenure for judges and said that
“man is not made to be trusted for life, if
secured against all liability to account,”
and that judges were “thieves of liberty.”
Theodore Roosevelt, who had appointed
Justice Holmes, strongly expressed his dis-
appointment after Holmes sided with the
trusts in the Northern Securities case, in
this way: “I could carve out of a banana
a judge with more backbone.”
Given such notorious illustrations of
irresponsible comments from high public
officials, can we educate the public to
distinguish between informed criticism and
collateral attack? This question leads to my
next one.
What Can We Do About the
Public’s Inadequate Understanding
of Judicial Independence?
I start with the following suggestions:
• If the criticism is not based on an objec-
tive standard but simply on the speak-
er’s personal opinion, or religious
belief, or disagreement with the deci-
sion or the underlying law, it should be
unpersuasive to fair-minded listeners.
The same goes for attacks on the
integrity or motives of judges.
• Because of ethical considerations,
judges rarely respond to attacks on
their rulings. Most people have an
innate sense of fairness. If adequately
informed, perhaps they may be unwilling
to be persuaded by a cheap shot.
About 30 years ago, I served on the
California Commission on Fair Judicial
Election Practices. At a public hearing in
Los Angeles, witnesses did not compre-
hend the difference between state or county
legislators campaigning on their past
records and future programs and judicial
candidates who are neither advocates for
their decisions nor sponsors of program
agendas. Some witnesses wondered why
for example, judges should not have to
defend their sentences in particular cases.
The public does not seem to appreciate
that every judicial election presents both
the opportunity to educate the public
about the judiciary and the risk of
misinformation and partisanship.
I do not sense any improvement in public
understanding or appreciation for the role
of our judiciary over the past 30 years. In
fact, the situation has gotten worse. With
the reduced emphasis on teaching civics in
the schools, the prominence of so-called
judicial reality shows that do not neces-
sarily correspond to reality, the general
failure of the media to educate the public
seriously and in depth, and public apathy
in general, the public does not have a good
understanding of the role of judges or the
importance of their independence.
A recent American Bar Association poll
found that over 56 percent of the American
public agrees with the statement that
“judicial activism . . . seems to have
reached a crisis. Judges routinely overrule
the will of the people.”
In her opening statement on the
rule of law as the new Chair of the ABA
Section of Litigation, my ALI colleague
Kim Askew describes “Mamie Farley . . .
[her] fourth-grade teacher. She introduced
me to the principles of ‘rule of law’ and
‘independence of the judiciary.’ . . . [S]he
made civics and government come alive
in the classroom. She believed in our con-
stitutional system and made its principles a
lot more interesting than the usual math
and reading assignments.
“She explained separation of powers
and the three separate and equal branches
of government. She introduced me to the
concept of checks and balances. Because of
her, the terms ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’
became a part of this young student’s
lexicon.” How many of us here today can
relate similar stories from our childhood
or, more recently, from our children or
grandchildren in the fourth grade, the
seventh grade, or any grade? We need
many more Miss Farleys.
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